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ABSTRACT
An overview of policy evaluation based on linear-quadratic non-
cooperative difference games is presented. Zt is argued that such games
provide a microeconomic foundation of ad-hoc macroeconomic models with
forward-looking behaviour and are therefore immune to the Lucas critique
of econometric policy evaluation. When there is a dominant player (such as
the Central Bank or Treasury), the Stackelberg difference game (with pri-
vate sector agents as followers) is relevant. For these non-cooperative
games there is a problem of time inconsistency, as the dominant player has
an incentive to renege on announced polic,ies, and therefore the dominant
player needs to precommit itself. If it cannot, a subgame perfect equili-
brium is required. Subgame perfectness is a stronger concept than time
consistency, which can be seen from the fact that the Nash difference game
with precommitment is time consistent even though it is not subgame per-
fect. The paper gives on overview of the various solution concepts (open-
loop Nash, subgame-perfect Nash, open-loop Stackelberg, subgame-perfect
1) This paper arose from an earlier paper, entitled "Non-cooperative
strategies for dynamic policy games and the problem of time inconsistency:
A comment", and has benefited from the comments of three anonymous refe-
rees.Stackelberg) for difference games and stresses that the use of the state
space (rather than the final form) representation is essential for a pro-
per evaluation of these concepts. The paper also discusses the use of the
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The Lucas (1976) critique of econometric policy evaluation has
increased the interest in applications of rational expectations and non-
cooperative difference~differential game theory to dynamic economic or
econometric models, because these techniques take explicitly into account
the reaction of the private sector (such as households and firms) to chan-
ges in government economic policy. Non-cooperative difference~differential
games of the Stackelberg variety, with the government as leader and the
private sector agents as followers, provide a microeconomic foundation of
ad-hoc macroeconomic models with expectations of future government econo-
mic policy affecting the current state of the economy. Obviously, the
advantage of difference~differential games over ad-hoc models is that they
are immune to the Lucas (1976) critique of policy evaluation as the beha-
viour of the private sector is no longer invariant to the policy rule
adopted by the government. It is well known that economies with rational
expectations or open-loop Stackelberg dynamic games are non-causal due to
the anticipation of future actions of dominant players (such as the Trea-
sury or the Central Bank). In such models the problem of time inconsisten-
cy arises due to the incentive of dominant players to renege on announced
strategies (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). If there are no binding commit-
ments, such models are vulnerable to cheating from the side of the domi-
nant player (e.g., the government). A trade-off occurs between cashing in
on short-term gains by cheating and building a strong reputation by re-
fraining from cheating (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Barro and Gordon, 1983;
Backus and Driffill, 1985; Meijdam and de Zeeuw, 1986). If the government
cannot commit itself and does not have a strong reputation, the private
sector cannot be expected to believe time-inconsistent announcements and
therefore such economic policies are not credible. The feedback Stackel-
berg solution concept (Simaan and Cruz, 1973) assumes that the players can
change their strategies all the time on the basis of observations on the
evolution of the state of the economic system and is therefore by con-
struction time-consistent. This solution concept can be seen as an appli-
cation of the concept of subgame perfectness (Selten, 1975) or an exten-
sion of the principle of optimality (Bellman, 1957) to games. Because it
is assumed that the players are ex-ante given the opportunity to renege at2
each stage of the game, ex-post they will not renege and therefore this
concept leads to time-consistent policies by construction. However, sub-
game perfectness is stronger than time consistency, so that it is possible
to formulate a time-consistent open-loop Stackelberg solution which is not
subgame perfect (Meijdam and de Zeeuw, 1986). The point is that time con-
sistency implies that there is no incentive to deviate from the equili-
brium path and that subgame perfectness implies that there is no incentive
to deviate from points that are off the equilibrium path either. Two as-
pects distinguish the feedback concept from the open-loop concept, namely
information structure (Basar and Olsder, 1982) and period of commitment
(Reinganum and Stokey, 1985). In the feedback concept it is assumed that
the players draw information on the present state of the economic system
and have a period of commitment of one, whereas in the open-loop concept
there is only information on the initial state of the economic system and
the period of commitment is equal to the planning period. When only the
information structure is changed but the period of commitment remains the
planning period, it is common to use the term closed-loop (memory). When
there are even no commitments within each period and the players are sup-
posed to act simultaneously, the Nash solution concept results because the
Nash announcement is the only credible announcement (Meijdam and de Zeeuw,
1986).
The Nash solution concept represents the standard approach to non-
cooperative dynamic games. The open-loop Nash equilibrium does not suffer
from time inconsistency, because there is no dominant player that can
manipulate the current actions of the other players by making announce-
ments about its own future actions. The feedback Nash equilibrium again
presupposes another information structure and no binding commitments. It
is constructed by imposing subgame perfectness. When the conventional
"stacking" procedure or final-form model for policy evaluation problems
(Theil, 1964) is used, the open-loop model always results which can be
compared with the concept of games in normal form. As a consequence typi-
cal dynamical aspects of dynamic games and games in extensive form such as
the principle of subgame perfectness cannot be discussed within this
framework.
A third solution concept for non-cooperative dynamic games, the
consistent conjectural variations equilibrium, was introduced in oligopoly3
theory by Bresnahan (1981) and was recently applied to an open-loop diffe-
rence game (Hughes Hallett, 1984; Brandsma and Hughes Hallett, 1984) and a
feedback difference game (Basar, Turnovsky and d'Orey, 1986). Although it
is argued that the concept is logically inconsistent (Daughety, 1985; de
Zeeuw and van der Ploeg, 198~), the main importance for the discussion in
this paper is that the open-loop consistent conjectural variations equili-
brium is time inconsistent.
This paper will give an overview of different solution concepts
with their properties and show the results for a standard abstract linear
quadratic policy evaluation problem. Special attention is given to the
consistent conjectural variations approach, because it is felt that this
is not the proper way to go. In section 2 the abstract prototype model is
formulated and different decision models or game theoretic solution con-
cepts are discussed. In section 3 properties such as time consistency,
subgame perfectness and credibility are defined and evaluated. Section 4
concludes the paper.
2. Linear-quadratic difference games: An evaluation
2.1. Model and solution concepts
In this section some essential concepts for dynamic policy evalua-
tion are discussed and a standard abstract dynamic model is formulated in
order to elucidate the conceptual discussion.
The starting point is a linear dynamic economic model in state-
space form:
1 1 2 2
yt - At yt-1 } Bt xt } Bt xt ~` st ' Y~ - Y~ . (1)
The transition of the state y of the economy from period t-1 to period t
is influenced by two players (such as the government and the private sec-
tor) who independently control the exogeneous variables xl and x2, respec-
tively. The non-controllable exogeneous variables are denoted by s. The
objective of player i, i- 1,2, is to minimize a quadratic welfare loss
function over a finite horizon:4
T ,
- F~{Yt Qt Yt t xt Rt xt} , i- 1,2.
t-i
(2)
where Qt ~ 0 and Rt ~ 0. An extension with linear terms in the welfare
loss function is straightforward by redefining the state vector, yt, and
st in an appropriate way. The convex linear-quadratic structure is not
essential for the discussion but facilitates analytical solutions. It can
always be considered as an approximation to the real structure of a speci-
fic model. The problem is called an optimal control problem with two deci-
sion makers or a difference game.
The traditional approach (Theil, 1964) to an economic optimal
control problem is to cast the economic model (1) into a final-form model:
Y- B1 xl t B2 x2 t s. (3)
where y, xl and x2 stack the state variables yt and the policy instruments
xl and x2 for all periods of the finite planning horizon. Consequently, B1
and B2 tare block-triangular matrices composed of At, Bt and Bt, and s
contains the non-controllable exogeneous variables st as well as the in-
fluence of the initial state vector y~2). The corresponding objective
functionals become
~
wl -~{y' Ql y t xl Ri xl} , i- 1,2 , (4)
where the matrices Q1 and R1 are block-diagonal as the welfare loss func-
tions (2) were assumed to be time separable. In this form the problem
cannot be distinguished from a static problem, so that it corresponds to
the normal form of the difference game. It explains why after this trans-
formation into final form some crucial dynamical issues disappear. This
will become clear in the sequel.
2~ To be precise, B1 -(B1 ) where B1 - 0, j~ k, B1. - B1, Bi -
~ 1 i ~k ~k ~~ ~ Jk
IT (A~) B~, j~ k, for j- 1,...T, k- 1,...T and i- 1,2.
~Z-k5
The by now standard approach to a difference game is to distin-
guish information patterns and periods of commitment. The decision makers
or players announce strategies for the whole planning period but may or
may not be committed to stick to these strategies. A strategy is a mapping
from the information set and time to the set of available actions. Consi-
dering the state of the economic system, this information set can contain
only the initial state (open-loop information), only the present state
(closed-loop, no memory information) or all the states up to the present
state (closed-loop memory information). Memory information complicates
matters considerably and can sometimes be excluded on the grounds of boun-
ded rationality (e.g., Rubinstein, 198~). The model with an open-loop
information structure and a period of commitment equal to the planning
horizon will be called the open-loop model. The model with a closed-loop
no memory information structure and a period of commitment of one period
will be called the feedback model. In the feedback model the players have
access to the current state of the economy and are ex-ante given the op-
portunity to renege on announced strategies at each stage of the game, so
that in equilibrium they have no incentive to renege. The open-loop model
is equivalent to the optimal control model based on a final-form economic
model, which was described earlier.
The standard techniques to solve optimal control problems are
Bellman's dynamic programming and Pontryagin's minimum principle. For an
optimal control problem with one decision maker the two techniques yield
the same optímal actions and performance3). For an optimal control pro-
blem with two or more decision makers these techniques lead in general to
different solutions. The reason is that dynamic programming solves the
feedback model and the minimum principle solves the open-loop model. To
put it differently, dynamic programming presupposes information on the
present state of the economic system and no commitments, whereas the mini-
mum principle presupposes information on the initial state of the economic
system and binding commitments. In the context of a game these assumptions
have their influence. In the feedback model the players can observe the
3) In a stochastic world, dynamic programming leads to policy feedback
rules that take account of stochastic shocks and therefore lead to a lower
expected welfare loss.6
effects of the actions of their opponent and they can react to these ob-
servations, whereas in the open-loop model they cannot. Dynamic program-
ming as a solution technique to a one-player optimal control problem is
based on Bellman's principle of optimality. Dynamic programming as a solu-
tion framework for a difference game presupposes a generalization of the
principle of optimality to dynamic games, which is called subgame perfect-
ness and which is treated in more detail in the next section.
The two solution techniques have in common that they transform the
dynamic optimization problem into a series of static optimization problems
in a dynamic setting. When the minimum principle is applied, the optimiza-
tion part of the solution is the static optimization of the Hamiltonian.
When dynamic programming is applied the optimization part of the solution
is the static optimization of the right-hand side of the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation. As a consequence the game theory involved is limited to
static equilibrium concepts.
2.2. Open-loop and feedback Nash equilibrium
The standard non-cooperative equilibrium concept is the Nash con-
cept which is based upon the idea that there should be no individual in-
centive for any player to deviate from the equilibrium. The Nash equili-
brium assumes that the players act simultaneously and form expectations of
each other's action, which in equilibrium are fulfilled. This implies that
the Nash equilibrium is the intersection of the hypothetical reaction
curves which express the optimal decisions of each player conditional on
the action of the rival. For the prototype model (1), (2) the first-order
conditions of the optimization problem
Rt xt t Bt {Kt Yt t gt} - ~ , i- 1.2,
where yt is given by (1), lead to the hypothetical reaction functions
xi --(Ri } Bi' Ki Bi)-1 Bi' Ki
(A Y t B~ x~ t s ' gl) . t t t t t t t t t-1 t t t t
i i i' i
(5)
j ~ i, i - 1,2 (5')For the open-loop decision model the terms {Kt yt t gt} are the
so-called co-states (or adjoint variables) of the minimum principle. The
parameters Kt and gt can be determined from the backward recursive equa-
tions:4)
i i , i -1




t]-1(st - Bt [Rt]-1 B~'g~
- Bt [Rt]-1 Bt' gt) t gt}
gT - ~ , i - 1.2,
where Et - I t Bt [Rt]-1 Bt Kt t Bt [Rt]-1 Bt~Kt .
(6)
(7)
For the feedback decision model the terms Kt and gt are the para-
meters of the quadratic so-called value functions of dynamic programming:
~ yt-1 Kt-1 yt-1 } gt,l yt-1 ~` ct-1
- min {} y' Q1 y t} xl~ R1 xl t} y' K1 y t gl~y t cl}-
xi t-1 t-1 t-1 t t t t t t t t t
t
They follow from the backward recursive equations:
i i -1 i i i-1 i' i -1
Kt-1 - Qt-1 } At CEt] (1 } Kt Bt CRt] Bt ) Kt [Et] At ,
(8)
KT - Qr ,
4) The proofs of all results are available upon request from the suthors.8
,
gt-1 - At CEt~-1
(I ; Kit B~ [R~~-1 B~ )
~
{Kt [Et]- (st - Bt
[Rt~- Bt gt
- Bt [R~~-1 B~'g~) ; g~} ,
- 0 , i - 1,2 .
(9)
The Nash equilibrium is given by the íntersection of the two hypo-
thetical reaction functions, (5'):
xt - Gt yt-1 } ht ' i- 1'2'
where
and
Gi - Ri -1 Bi' Ki E-1 A
t -[ t~ t t[ t~ t
h~ - - [R~~-1
B~~{Kt [gt~-1 (st
- B1
[R1~-1 B1'gl B2 [R2~-1
B2' g2) t gl}
t t t t- t t t t t'
(10)
It is essential to note that the relationship between xt and yt-1 in (10)
is only a real functional relationship in the feedback model; it does not
represent the policy feedback rule of player i in the open-loop model.
Furthermore, the feedback equilibrium strategies {Gt, ht} are not binding
and can be changed whenever one of the players wants to do so. The open-
loop equilibrium consists of binding sequences of actions {xt} which re-
sult from (10) and (1) together with (6) and (7) and which only depend
upon the initial state y0, so that unexpected state trajectories cannot
have their influence. This open-loop outcome coincides with the Nash equi-
librium of the static problem (3), (4). The transformation of the economic
model into final form implies that issues like information and commitment
are disregarded or, to be more precise, static information patterns and
periods of commitment equal to the planning horizon are implicitly assu-
med. It is worth mentioning here that both open-loop and feedback policy9
rules can be inferior to closed-loop memory policy rules where the players
condition their strategies on information on current and past states of
the economy (Basar and Olsder, 1982, Section 6.3; de Zeeuw, 1984, Section
4.3)
The open-loop and feedback Nash decision models can have very
different economic results. Consider as an example the problem of an oli-
gopoly with restricted entry and exit harvesting a renewable resource with
zero extraction costs, iso-elastic demand and serially uncorrelated shocks
to the natural replenishment rate. It can then be shown that the open-loop
extraction rates obey Hotelling-type arbitrage rules and are therefore
efficient whilst the feedback equilibrium leads to excessive extraction
rates or even extinction of the resource (van der Ploeg, 1986). The reason
is that when an individual firm decides to harvest an additional unit, it
realizes that the lower stock increases harvesting costs to the other
firms and therefore the other firms will in the feedback model react by
harvesting less. This means that the marginal cost of harvesting an addi-
tional unit is less than in the absence of such a response from its ri-
vals, hence the feedback model leads to excessive harvesting. (With free
entry and exit, the harvesting rates in the feedback model become effi-
cient.) To take another example, in a model of competitive arms accumula-
tion between two eountries, where each country has a"guns versus butter"
dilemma, the feedback Nash equilibrium proves to be more efficient and
leads to less arms accumulation than the open-loop Nash equilibrium (van
der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 1986). The reason is that when one country decides
to invest in an additional weapon, it realizes that the security of rival
countries is threatened and therefore in the feedback model the rivals
respond by investing more in weapons. Obviously, this increases the margi-
nal cost of investment in an additional weapon and therefore the feedback
model results in lower weapon stocks. (The policy recommendation is that
countries should agree to monitor each other's weapon stocks.)10
2.3. Open-loop and feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
Another standard non-cooperative equilibrium concept is the Stac-
kelberg concept. The difference with the Nash concept is the leader~follo-
wer structure which means that one of the players (the leader) acts first
or, to put it differently, the action or strategy of the leader is part of
the information set of the follower. There are again two optimization
problems. The first one determines the rational reaction of the follower
to the action or strategy of the leader. This rational reaction, which is
not a hypothetical reaction as in the Nash concept but a real reaction, is
given by the reaction function for the follower (5'). The second optimiza-
tion problem determines the optimal action or strategy of the leader given
the rational reaction of the follower.
For the open-loop decision model this implies that the constraints
of this optimization problem consist of the forward recursive system (1),
equation (5') for the follower and the backward recursive system for the
co-states. The resulting open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium (Kydland, 1975;
Basar and Olsder, 1982, Section ~.2; de Zeeuw, 1984, Section 4.5) for the
prototype model will not be given here, because it is not immediately
relevant for this evaluation.5) The backward recursiveness of the so-
called adjoint system implíes forward-looking behaviour of the follower,
which leads to time inconsistency of the optimal actions of the leader.
Hence, the leader can by making announcements about its future policy
actions manipulate the current policy actions of the follower. However,
once the follower has implemented these actions, it may pay the leader to
renege and deviate from the previous announcements about its policies.
These issues of time inconsistency will be dealt with in the next section.
5) In any case, one could in principle obtain the open-loop Stackelberg
equilibrium as the static Stackelberg equilibrium of the final-form model
(3). That is, xi
--(Ri } Bi' Qi Bi)-1
(B~ x~ t s) is the optimal reac-
tion of the follower i to the actions of the leader j. The leader mini-
mizes its welfare loss function subject to the reaction function of the
Follower, which gives
xj --(Rj { Bj' Qj Bj)-1
s where B~ ;[I - B1(R1 ~ B1~Qlgi)-1~B~.11
For the feedback decision model the first-order conditions of the
two optimization problems are
Rt xt t Bt~{Kt yt t gt} - 0
Rt xt t{Bt t(~xt~~xt)Bt1}{Kt yt f gt} - 0
where i is the follower and j is the leader. The crucisl difference with
the Nash concept is the reaction coefficient ~xt~~xt --(RttBt~KtBt)-1
Bt KtBt. The feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is given by
i i ~ ~ ii i
xt - Ft {At yt-1 } Bt xt } st} ; Ft gt
j j ji i jj j




- ~R1 ~ gl' K1 BZ]-1 gl,
t t t t t
Fi - Fli K1
t t t
Fjj --~Rj ~ Bj~(I~B1Fi)~ Kj (1~BiFi) Bj~-1 Bj~(ItBiFi)~
t t t t t t t t t t t t
Ji JJ J 1 il
Ft - Ft Kt Bt Ft
FJ - FJJ KJ ( 1'B1F1) t t t t t
and the backward recursions by
j j ~
Kt-1 - et-1 } At {(I}BtFt)~ Ft
Ft (ItBtFt) t
(ItBtFt)' (ItBtFt)' Kt (ItBtFt) (ItBtFt)} At
(12)12
j j ~{ j~ j j
Kt-1 - Qt-1 4 At Ft Rt Ft
t
(ItBtFt)' (ItBtFt)' Kt (ItBtFt) (ItBtFt)} At
KT - QZ,
gl- - A' {(ItB~F~)' Fl R1 [F1 (ItB~F~) s t
t 1 t t t t t t t t t
ii i i j ji i i j jj j
Ft gt ; Ft Bt Ft gt t Ft Bt Ft gt] t
(ItBtFt)' (ItBtFt)' {Kt [(I.BtFt) (I.BtFt) st t
Bi F11 g1 ~(IfB1F1) BJ (FJ1 gl 4 FJJ gJ)] t gl}}
t t t t t t t t t t t
, ' i i
gt-1 - At {Ft Rt [Ft st t Ft gt t Ft~ gt] t
(ItBtFt)' (ItBtFt)' {Kt [(ItBtFt) (ItBtFt) st 4
tl gt ;(ItBtFt) Bt (Ft gt t Ft gt)] t gt}}
i i i j ji i jj j
Given the parameters, the action xt of the follower i is a function of the
state yt-1 and the action xt of the leader j which both belong to the
follower's information set. The action xt of the leader j is only a func-
tion of the state yt-1. It is essential to note that for logical reasons
the players cannot have each other's action in their information set at
the same time. Either player i acts first, so that the action xt is part
of the information set of player j, or it is the other way around. The
follower just plays optimally given the state of the economy and the ac-
tion of the leader. In the Stackelberg equilibrium the leader expects the
follower to react rationally and the action is chosen accordingly. The
rational reaction is determined by the first equation of (11) and influen-
ces the reaction coefficient ~xt~~xt as well as the state transition yt in13
the second equation of (11). After substitution of this rational reaction
the second equation of (11) determines the optimal action of the leader
and not an optimal reaction, because the leader is not reacting to the
follower. These considerations are essentially of a static nature within
each subgame and they apply also to the open-loop decision model, especi-
ally when the final-form representation (3), (4) is used. The only diffe-
rence is that in the feedback decision model the leader reacts indirectly
to past actions of the follower through observations on the state of the
economy. The feedback model is obtained from dynamamic prgramming and
therefore satisfies subgame perfectness. This means that the leader has no
incentive to deviate and therefore its policies are time consistent by
construction.
2.4. Consistent conjectural variations equilibrium
Recently, a third non-cooperative equilibrium concept for diffe-
rence games was developed: a consistent conjectural variations equilibrium
(for the open-loop case from the final-form representation: Hughes Hal-
lett, 1984; Brandsma and Hughes Hallett, 1984; for the feedback case:
Basar, Turnovsky and d'Orey, 1986). The equilibrium was introduced in the
context of oligopoly theory ( Bresnahan, 1981) and is based upon the con-
cept of conjectural variation ( Bowley, 1924). A conjectural variation in
this context is a coefficient ~xt~~xt as in (11), which comes from a
conjecture of player j with respect to the reaction of player i. In the
Stackelberg equilibrium the leader conjectures a rational reaction func-
tion of the follower. In the Nash equilibrium the two players conjecture
the action of the other player and they are right in their conjecture
(consistency argument). The idea behind the consistent conjectural varia-
tions equilibrium is that the two players conjecture the reaction of the
other player and that they are right in their conjecture. The equilibrium
is determined by introducting conjectural variations for both players and
requiring consistency of conjectural variations and reaction coefficients.
This seems a natural extension in the line of Nash and Stackelberg, but
one ends up with logical inconsistencies ( Daughety, 1985; de Zeeuw and van
der Ploeg, 1987). The reason is simply, as stated before, that the players14
cannot react to each other at the same time, so that a fortiori conjectu-
res and reactions cannot be consistent. The reaction functions that show
up in the calculation of the Nash equilibrium are hypothetical or repre-
sent a possible reaction process in notional time, which is not concei-
vable for the consistent conjectural variations concept. It is certainly
not true that the proposed equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium or, worse, a
superior one (as stated in Hughes Hallett, 1984; Brandsma and Hughes Hal-
lett, 1984).
The idea of conjectures and conjectural variations is all right,
but the consistency argument should be different. There are two ways out.
The first one is to formulate an infinite regress decision model of the
type "player i conjectures that player j conjectures that player i conjec-
tures...." (Daughety, 1985). The other way out is to start with conjectu-
res and corresponding conjectural variations and to require consistency of
conjectures and actions. To stress the difference the resulting equili-
brium will be called consistent conjectures eguilibrium. The first-order
conditions with conjectures are:
Rt xt t{Bt~t (~xt~~xt) st~} {xt yt t gt} - o
Rt xt t{Bt~t (~xt~~xt) Bt }{Kt Yt t gt} - 0
where
i i j j
yt - At yt-1 } Bt xt }
Bt xt t st.
(13)
The conjectures xt(xt) and xt(xt) account for the conjectural variations
~x~~~xl and ~xl~~x~. The first equation becomes an equation in xi determi- t t t t t
ning the optimal action of player i and the second one becomes an equation
in xt determining the optimal action of player j. Consistency of conjectu-
res and actions requires that these optimal actions fit the conjectures,
which yields restrictions on the parameters of the conjectures. This wea-
ker concept of consistency usually leads to multiple equilibria. How can
the idea of consistency of conjectures and reactions arise? Zn that líte-
rature reaction functions are created by not substituting the conjectures
in the state transition yt. The resulting "reaction functions" lead to15
reaction coefficients which are required to match the conjectural varia-
tions. There are, however, not only these logical difficulties. The con-
sisr.ent conjectural variations equilibrium for the open-loop model in
f'inal form (3), (4) suffers from more problems. Firstly, the result is
time inconsistent for the same reason as the Stackelberg open-loop equili-
brium is (see section 3). Secondly, the informational requirements seem
particularly unrealistic. Finally, the outcome is typically worse for the
players than the Nash outcome and it suffers from non-uniqueness and in-
stability. Twe examples will clarify these statements.
Example 1(Hughes Hallett, 1984. pp- 389-390)
Consider the game with objectives wl
- y2;x12
where y- xltx2-1.
The Nash equilibrium is x1 - 1~3 with outcome wl - 2~9.
Hughes Hallett argues that xl - 2~5 is a better solution, because
the associated outcome wl - 1~5 implies an improvement for both players.
This ís not surprising, since it is well kno~an that it is possible to find
Pureto improvements over the Nash outcome even though there is no unilate-
ral incentive for any player to deviate from the Nash equilibrium. In
i
fact, x - 2~5 is what is generally called the Nash bargaining solution.
Hcwever, the solution is not sustained as a consistent conjectural varia-
tions equilibrium. To find one, Hughes Hallett describes an iterative
procedure and searches for a fixed point in the conjectured and actual
"reaction coefficients". This procedure starts from an initial pair
(dl,d2) of conjectural variations, where d1-~xl~~x~, and yields new pairs
being the corresponding "reaction coefficients" (-( 1}d2)~(2td2),
-(ltdl)~(2td1)). There are two fixed points here, namely dl --3~2 t 1~2
f with corresponding actions xl - 1~2 t 1~10 ~ and outcome wl - 1~2 t
1~10 f. Both consistent conjectural variations equilibria produce worse
results for both players as compared to the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore,
they do not satisfy the Nash property since each player can unilaterally
impx~ove by playing, for example, xl - 1~4 t 1~20 f. Finally, it follows
f'rom the derivative of the fixed point mapping, - 1~(2td1)2 --3~2 t 1~2
~, that one of the fixed points (dl -- 3~2 t 1~2 f) is stable whilst
the other is iinstable.16
The Pareto improvement xl - 2~5 is, however, sustained as a con-
sistent conjectures equilibrium. The conjectures "my rival mimicks what I
do", xl - x~, with conjectural variations 1 lead to optimal actions xl -
2~5, which are consistent with the conjectures. The Nash equilibrium is
also sustained as a consistent conjectures equilibrium. The consistent
conjectures are in this case xl - 1~3 with conjectural variations 0. A
final example of such an equilibrium is the solution xl - 0 with outcome
wl - 1, which results from the conjectures xl --x~ with conjectural vari-
ations -1. However, this outcome is obviously unattractive for the play-
ers.
Fxample 2
Consider the game with objectives wl - 1~2(y'ytxl~xl) where y-
xltx2;s, s-[1,1]'. The Nash equilibrium is xl -[-1~3, -1~3]' with out-
come wl - 2~9.
The consistent conjectural variations (D1, D2) are characterized
by
(Dl)2 t 3 Di t I- 0 . (14)
There are an infinite number of solutions to (14), which can be found
analytically after some tedious calculations. Hughes Hallett's iterative
scheme is
D1 - - (2I t D~)-1 (I ' D~) - (2I . D~)-1 - I.
stl s s s
The local stability of the iterative scheme in the neighbourhood of the
fixed points follows if all of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
,
~ vec DS}1 ~~ vec Ds --{(2I t Ds)-1 ~ ( 2I t Dg)-1} ,
evaluated at D~, are inside the unit circle. It can be shown after consi-
derable manipulation that D1 -(-3~2 t 1~2 f) I is the only stable fixed
point. Again the corresponding welfare loss, wl - 1~2 - 1~10 ~, is higher17
than the welfare loss which can be obtained under the Nash concept. Final-
ly, the Nash equilibrium is not sustained as a conjectural variations
equilibrium, because xl --1~3 s, xi - D1(xlts) and (14) are inconsistent.
3. Time inconsistency, subgame perfectness and credibility
In section 2 several decision models for dynamic policy evaluation
problems have been díscussed. This section discusses properties of these
dynamic decision models, such as time inconsistency, subgame perfectness
and credibility.
A strategy is time inconsistent if there is an incentive for the
player to renege on this strategy in the future (Kydland and Prescott,
1977). A decision model which typically has time-inconsistent strategies
is the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. In this equilibrium the leader's
strategy {xi,...,xT} is optimal given the follower's rational reaction
{xi,...,xT}. However, at time s) 1 the remaining strategy {xs,...,xT} of
the leader is typically not optimal anymore. The reason is that at time s
the actions {xS,...,xT) have done the job of influencing the past actions
of the follower and can now be solely employed to influence the present
and future actions of the follower. The strategy announcement {xS,...,xT}
can be considered as some sort of threat which helped to have the follower
play {xi,...,xs-1}. For example, a benevolent government, who maximizes
the gross consumers' surplus of the representative household, may announce
taxation of the supply of labour rather than of capital tomorrow in order
to induce agents to accumulate capital today. Once the capital stock is in
place, it pays the government (improves economic welfare) to renege by
taxing capital, instead of labour, tomorrow, despite the fact that the
government has the same preferences as the representative household (Fis-
cher, 1980). The crucial point is the forward-looking behaviour of the
follower which looses its impact as soon as actions are performed. In the
example, once the investment has occurred, the government can extract the
quasi-rent on it. The same phenomenon occurs in other models with forward-
looking variables such as models with rational expectations. For example,
the optimal taxation of a monetary economy with a Cagan-type money demand18
function is time inconsistent (Calvo, 1978). The reason is that the go-
vernment finds it optimal to announce a low monetary growth rate in order
to induce large holdings of real money balances and low inflation, but
once the real money balances have been accumulated it pays the government
to renege and impose a surprise inflation tax. Alternatively, in an econo-
my with nominal wage rigidity the government might announce a low money
supply in order to induce workers to lock themselves into low nominal wage
contracts. Once they have done this, the government has an incentive to
renege and implement a high money supply and thus gain more employment
without pushing up the price level (e.g., Kydland and Prescott, 1977;
Barro and Gordon, 1983)-
This type of forward-looking behaviour can easily be derived for
the prototype model in section 2. For the follower the strategy xt of the
leader has the same role as the exogeneous input st. The rational reaction
xt of the follower is given by equation (5') which means that it is a
function of xt and gt. According to (7) gt is a function of all the future
exogeneous inputs, so that xt is a function of present and future actions
of the leader:
xt - ~(xt, . .xT).
There is one logical difficulty in this analysis. Strictly speaking the
players cannot renege in an open-loop decision model. However, time incon-
sistency remains a possible property of a decision model which can be
regarded as undesirable or unrealistic. The feedback Stackelberg equili-
brium, on the other hand, is time consistent by construction, because it
is based on the idea that the players are ex-ante constantly given the
opportunity to renege and therefore ex-post have no incentive to renege.
But there is more. Feedback decision models have the stronger property of
subgame perfectness. A game equilibrium is subgame perfect if it remains
an equilibrium for any subgame. A subgame in this respect is a game with
the same players, objectives and system dynamics, but starting from an
arbitrary state ys at time s, 1( s( T. This concept reveals precisely
the structure of dynamic programming and thus of the feedback decision
model. It can be said that subgame perfectness is time consistency on the
equilibrium path as well as off the equilibrium path. A subgame perfect19
equilibrium is robust against mistakes or other unexpected events ( Selten,
1975). Because subgame perfectness is stronger than time consistency, it
is possible to formulate a Stackelberg equilibrium which is time consis-
tent but not subgame perfect ( Meijdam and de Zeeuw, 1986). The idea is to
keep the open-loop decision structure but to cut off the forward-looking
behaviour of the follower. It is also possible to achieve time consistency
by requiring that the leader follows a feedback decision model, whereas
the follower still has the open-loop decision model ( Cohen and Michel,
1985).
The open-loop Nash equilibrium is time consistent. As long as the
state of the economic system follows the open-loop Nash equilibrium path
none of the players has an incentive to renege. The open-loop consistent
conjectural variations equilibrium, however, is time inconsistent for the
same reason as the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is. Time inconsisten-
cy is a property of an equilibrium and can only be avoided by changing the
equilibrium concept. It is not possible to solve the problem technically
(as stated in Hughes Hallet, 1984; Brandsma and Hughes Hallett, 1984)6).
A strategy is credible if it contains announcements on future
actions and if these announcements are believed by the other players.
Announcements are believed if they are considered to be optimal at the
time of action or, alternatively, if there is no incentive to deviate from
the announcements. The open-loop decision model typically contains an-
nouncements on future actions. Time-inconsistent strategies are an example
of strategies that are not credible. The credibility problem can also
occur in a static context where players are in principle of equal strength
and act simultaneously. One of the players can try to become a Stackelberg
leader by announcing his action beforehand. If the announcement has effect
the Stackelberg equilibrium may result. In this case, however, the "lea-
der" can do even better, because generally there will be an incentive to
deviate from the announcement under the assumption that the other player
expects it to be true. In this simple framework the only credible announ-
cement is the Nash action, because this is the only announcement that is
6) These problems also feature in Hillier's ( 1987) comment on Hughes
Hallett (1987).20
at the same time the optimal reaction to the optimal reaction to the an-
nouncement (Meijdam and de Zeeuw, 1986). However, in a more advanced
framework with imperfect (or incomplete) information, reputational effects
can lead to credible strategies which are not Nash (Kreps and Wilson,
1982). For example, with incomplete information it is possible to have the
private sector believing announcements of the government that it will
fight inflation, whereas with complete information the Nash announcement
of high inflation is the only credible one (Backus and Driffill, 1985).
Alternatively, reputational effects can occur when the game is repeated
indefinitely (e.g., Barro and Gordon, 1983}. When the discount rate is
small enough, this punishments from reneging are relatively large and
therefore there may be no temptation to renege even though the policy
actions may be time inconsistent in the absence of such reputational ef-
fects.
4. Conclusion
In this paper several methods to analyse policy problems with two
or more decision makers are evaluated. These methods employ decision mo-
dels which are distinguished according to different non-cooperative game
theoretic solution concepts (Nash, Stackelberg, consistent conjectural
variations), different information structures (open-loop, closed-loop) and
different periods of commitment. The decision models are evaluated by
considering properties such as time consistency, subgame perfectness and
credibility, and the links with solution techniques like dynamic program-
ming and the minimum principle are precisely described.
The formulation of the problem on the basis of economic models in
final form is rejected, because typical dynamical issues disappear in this
formulation. The consistent conjectural variations equilibrium is rejected
on principles of logic and the alternative consistent conjectures equili-
brium is presented. The decision model with open-loop information struc-
ture and binding commitments can suffer from time inconsistency, although
there is some logical contradiction here with the assumption of binding
commitments. The decision models with closed-loop information structure
and without commitments are subgame perfect and thus time consistent, and21
therefore they deserve more attention. When the Stackelberg leader~follo-
wer structure is based upon announcements and not upon sequential actions,
the requirement of credibility leads back to Nash. Credible strategies
which are not Nash can arise when it is possible to evoke reputational
effects.
The prototype model used in the paper is based on quadratic prefe-
rences and linear models, which keeps matters tractable. Although it is
relatively straightforward to develope iterative Gauss-Newton algorithms
to derive open-loop Stackelberg or Nash equilibrium solutions, it is very
difficult to calculate feedback Stackelberg or Nash equilibrium solutions
for non-linear models or non-quadratic preferences. The reason is that it
is usually impossible to find analytic expressions for the functional
forms of the value functions. All that one can do in such cases is to
discretize the space of control variables of the players and calculate the
subgame-perfect solution numerically by dynamic programming. Thís proce-
dure rapidly runs in to combinatorial problems and is thus very expensive
in terms of computer requirements of storage and time. This problem is
particularly severe when there are externalities or market imperfections
present, because it is then not possible to invoke the fundamental theorem
of welfare economics which says that the market (read difference~differen-
tial game) outcome is the same as the outcome of a centrally planned eco-
nomy. When there are no externalities or market imperfections, Kydland and
Prescott (1982) calculate the outcome of a centrally planned economy and
thus avoid the derivation of value functions for the market outcome. Un-
fortunately, for most interesting policy problems, this trick cannot be
used and future research must be concerned with the technical difficulties
of calculating subgame-perfect solutions for non-linear models (cf.,
Lucas, 1987).22
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